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Approval and Withdrawal of New
Antibiotics and Other Antiinfectives
in the U.S., 1980-2009
Kevin Outterson, John H. Powers, Enrique Seoane-Vazquez,
Rosa Rodriguez-Monguio, and Aaron S. Kesselheim

A

ntibiotic use triggers evolutionary and ecological responses from bacteria, leading to
antibiotic resistance and harmful patient
outcomes.1 Two complementary strategies support
long-term antibiotic effectiveness: conservation of
existing therapies and production of novel antibiotics.2 Conservation encompasses infection control,
antibiotic stewardship, and other public health interventions to prevent infection, which reduce antibiotic
demand.3 Production of new antibiotics allows physicians to replace existing drugs rendered less effective
by resistance.4
In recent years, physicians and policymakers have
raised concerns about the pipeline for new antibiotics, pointing to a decline in the number of antibiotics approved since the 1980s.5 This trend has been
attributed to high research and development costs,
low reimbursement for antibiotics, and regulatory
standards for review and approval.6 Professional societies and researchers around the world have called
for renewed emphasis on antimicrobial stewardship,7
while also supporting antibiotic research and development through grants, changes to intellectual property
laws to extend market exclusivity periods, and modification of premarket testing regulations to reduce
antibiotic development time and expenses. 8 In the
US, these legislative efforts recently culminated with
the enactment of the Generating Antibiotic Incentives
Now (GAIN) section of the Food and Drug Adminis-

tration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, which was
intended to promote the discovery of new antibiotics
by providing five years of additional market exclusivity
for new “qualified infectious disease products.”9 The
Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation
Act also created a fast track system to reduce clinical trial development time for breakthrough drugs,
including new antibiotics.10 The European Union has
also been active in considering new therapeutic development incentives together with other efforts such as
enhanced antimicrobial stewardship and support for
basic research.11
While incentives for antibiotic development may
hasten the arrival of a larger number of drugs, public health will be best served if these new drugs have
high clinical utility, discrete mechanisms of action
and narrow spectrums to delay resistance, and welldefined safety and efficacy profiles.12 In recent years,
however, there have been numerous high-profile
examples of approved antibiotics found to have safety
concerns, including trovafloxacin, which was withdrawn from the US market, and telithromycin, which
had two indications withdrawn in self-resolving diseases, but remains available for treatment of community-acquired pneumonia despite well-known safety
issues. Studies reporting simple counts of new antibiotic approvals do not adequately consider the clinical impact of the antibiotics — or subsequent safetyrelated withdrawals — and therefore may provide
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an incomplete picture of antibiotic development. To
better understand recent trends, we analyzed three
decades of FDA antibiotic approvals, together with
markers of antibiotic safety and efficacy. To put antibiotic trends in context, we compared these results
with approvals and withdrawals in other drug classes,
including other antiinfectives. Comparisons to other

NMEs and BLAs were withdrawn from the US market
as of December 31, 2011. Withdrawals were identified
in one of three ways: (1) publication by FDA of a notice
of withdrawal of approval in the Federal Register; (2)
listing of the product in the Orange Book discontinuation section; or (3) removal of the product from the
Orange Book approved applications section.

Studies reporting simple counts of new antibiotic approvals
do not adequately consider the clinical impact of the antibiotics — or
subsequent safety-related withdrawals — and therefore may provide an
incomplete picture of antibiotic development. To better understand recent
trends, we analyzed three decades of FDA antibiotic approvals, together with
markers of antibiotic safety and efficacy. To put antibiotic trends in context,
we compared these results with approvals and withdrawals in other drug
classes, including other antiinfectives.
drug classes, such as cardiovascular drugs, can illuminate whether the outcomes of our study are unique to
antibiotics or are common across several drug classes.
Comparisons between antibiotics, antivirals and antiretrovirals, and other antiinfectives can also identify
shifts in innovation within the antiinfective therapeutic class.

Data
Drug Classifications
From publicly available data on the FDA website
Drugs@FDA,13 we identified all new drug applications for new molecular entities (NMEs) and new
biologic license applications (BLAs) approved by the
FDA from January 1, 1980 through December 31,
2009. The dates of approval were confirmed using the
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book). We then classified
each drug based on its approved indication into a class
of the Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system maintained by the WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology of the
Norwegian Institute of Public Health.14 “Antiinfectives
for systemic use” (class J) were further subclassified
into three categories: “antibiotics for systemic use”
(subclass J01), “antivirals for systemic use” (subclass
J05), and “other antiinfectives” (all other subclasses,
which include antimycotics and vaccines). From the
same FDA databases, we identified whether each
drug in our sample was granted priority review or
orphan drug status by the FDA. Finally, using methods described by Qureshi et al.,15 we determined which

Characterization of Antibiotic Withdrawals
For all withdrawn drugs in the antibiotic subclass J01,
we then identified the specific date when these withdrawn drugs were discontinued from the US market.
Withdrawal of approval of an antibiotic generates
a specific announcement by the FDA, as described
above. However, for some antibiotics, the company
discontinued widespread sales of the antibiotic many
years before regulatory withdrawal. Such informal
discontinuations are rarely accompanied by a formal
announcement. We therefore defined the date of discontinuation as the calendar quarter in which commercial sales in the US dropped below US$100,000,
using data from IMS MIDAS (data available for 19932009 only). When IMS data were not available, we
used the date of the official FDA regulatory action.
We then categorized whether each antibiotic withdrawal was associated with a safety issue. A safetyrelated withdrawal was defined as a withdrawal that
occurred within a year after new safety-related warnings were added to the drug label, or one described
as such in regulatory notices published in the Federal
Register and other government reports, public company filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database, or other announcements
found in the Westlaw databases.
Finally, we noted the peak US sales and the sponsoring company for all withdrawn antibiotics. We characterized an antibiotic as “commercially successful”
if it achieved US sales exceeding $100 million (2010
dollars) in any calendar year. All data were analyzed
descriptively.

institutional corruption and the pharmaceutical industry • fall 2013

Electronic
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
availableat:at:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326765
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326765

689

IND EPEND ENT

Results
The FDA approved 815 NMEs and BLAs during the
study period, with a peak in the late 1990s. We found
that 35 new drugs in the class of antiinfectives were
approved in the 1980s (16% of all drug approvals),
as compared to 49 in the 1990s (15%), and 27 (11%)
in the 2000s. Among the subclass of antibiotics, 61
NMEs were approved overall, with the greatest number approved in the 1980s (29, 13% of all drug approvals), fewer in the 1990s (23, 7%) and still fewer the
2000s (9, 4%). Among the subclass of antivirals, 38
were approved overall, with the most in the 1990s (21,
6% of all drug approvals) and 2000s (13, 5%), and
the least in the 1980s (4, 2%) (Exhibit 1). A majority
of these antivirals were antiretroviral drugs for HIV
(n=24). Other antiinfective drug approvals totaled 2 in
the 1980s, 5 in the 1990s, and 5 in the 2000s, mainly
antimycotics and antimycobacterials (n=11 out of 12).
By comparison, during this time period, cardiovascular drugs had the largest number of NME approvals
in the 1980s (40, 18%), although the number of new
cardiovascular drugs fell in the 1990s (39, 12%) and
2000s (18, 7%). Antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents showed a different trajectory, with fewer
NME approvals in the 1980s (13, 6%), but becoming the largest therapeutic class for new approvals in
the 1990s (52, 15%) and 2000s (51, 20%) (Exhibit 2).
Overall, the number of approvals in all classes peaked
in the 1990s but improved slightly from the 1980s to
the 2000s (1980s=225; 1990s=339; 2000s=251).

Regulatory Classification of Antiinfectives
In our study period, the FDA approved 57 antiinfectives after priority review (1980s=16 (16% of all priority reviews), 1990s=24 (18%), 2000s=17 (20%)). Thus,
antiinfectives as a class claimed an increasing share of
all priority review approvals over time. Within the two
largest antiinfective subclasses, priority review antibiotics fell sharply after the 1980s (1980s=11 (11% of all
priority reviews), 1990s=3 (2%), 2000s=3 (4%)), while
priority review antivirals grew dramatically to a peak
in the 1990s (1980s=3 (3% of all priority reviews),
1990s=17 (13%), 2000s=11 (13%)), most of which were
antiretrovirals for HIV (n=22) (Exhibit 3). Overall, 51%
of approved antiinfectives and 28% of approved antibiotics received priority review, compared to 37% of
drugs approved in all other therapeutic classes.
Orphan drug designation was given at the time of
initial FDA approval to 3 antiretrovirals and 3 other
antiinfectives during our study period, but none were
given to antibiotics. By comparison, 153 drugs overall
received orphan drug designation, representing 20%
of all drugs approved after 1983.
Withdrawn Antibiotics
Among the 61 NME approved antibiotics, 26 were
withdrawn (43%), a rate far higher than was observed
among non-antibiotics (13%). The 26 withdrawn
antibiotics are described in Exhibit 4. The mean date
from approval to withdrawal was 15 years (interquartile range: 9-19 years). Withdrawals for safetyrelated reasons (n=6) generally occurred sooner after
approval, from 4 to 76 months after approval (mean:
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Exhibit 2
FDA Approvals of New Drugs, Percent of Totals, by ATC Class, 1980-2009
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Exhibit 2
FDA Approvals of New Drugs, Percent of Totals, by ATC Class, 1980-2009
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33 months). Withdrawals were greatest for drugs
approved in the years 1980-1984 (71%) and lowest for
drugs approved in the years 1985-1989 (33%). None of
the antibiotics approved in the 2000s was withdrawn
as of August 1, 2013.

Our data on antibiotic withdrawals have important policy implications for efforts to incentivize new
antibiotic development. Withdrawals among antibiotics in our sample occurred at more than triple
the rate of all other drugs. One explanation for this
high withdrawal rate is the substantial number of follow-on products approved. In our
sample, most withdrawn antibiotics could
This review of antiinfective approvals and
be generally characterized as secondary or
withdrawals suggests that reports warning
tertiary (or later) drugs in one of two imporof a decrease in antibiotic approvals over
tant drug classes: cephalosporins (n=10)
and fluoroquinolones (n=9). For example,
time and current-day nadir in antibiotic
most of the withdrawn cephalosporins were
approvals may be overstated.
approved after the introduction of commercially successful first, second, and third generation classes of cephalosporins by other
Only 2 withdrawn antibiotics received priority
companies (cefadroxil in 1978; cefuroxime in 1987;
review designation at initial approval (moxalactam
and ceftriaxone in 1984). Eight of the 9 withdrawn
and cefonicid). Few of the withdrawn antibiotics
fluoroquinolones were approved after Bayer introwere commercially successful (n=3, although comduced the blockbuster ciprofloxacin in 1987. To our
mercial sales data were available for 1993-2009 only)
knowledge, none of the drugs were withdrawn due to
and most were discontinued from the market several
emergence of significant antibiotic resistance, as sucyears before formal withdrawal. Withdrawn antibiotcessful drugs with similar resistance profiles remain
ics were concentrated among cephalosporins (n=10)
marketed and widely used. Many antibiotics are
and fluoroquinolones (n=9). Six of the 26 (23%) withapproved on the basis of non-inferiority trials, whose
drawn antibiotics were safety-related withdrawals,
primary hypothesis is to rule out how much worse
all of them fluoroquinolones approved in the 1990s:
a new antibiotic might be compared to an older
temafloxacin (approved in 1992), sparfloxacin (1996),
antibiotic.17 Therefore these studies do not directly
alatrofloxacin (1997), trovafloxacin (1997), grepafloxameasure whether new antibiotics have additional
cin (1997), and gatifloxacin (1999).16
benefits over currently approved therapies. While
After adjusting for withdrawals, the data for net
such sequential innovation can sometimes bring betFDA approvals of antibiotics, antivirals, and other
ter drugs to market, the high number of sequential
antiinfectives are shown in Exhibit 5. Amongst antiinnovations later withdrawn after poor sales suggests
biotics not withdrawn as of August 1, 2013, 13 were
low levels of clinical significance for these drugs. In a
approved in the 1980s, 13 in the 1990s, and 9 in the
recent review, Pulcini et al. identified 33 “forgotten”
2000s. For antivirals not withdrawn as of August 1,
antibiotics with potentially significant clinical value,
2013, 4 were approved in the 1980s, 19 in the 1990s,
but amongst the 26 withdrawn antibiotics, only cefoand 13 in the 2000s. For other antiinfectives not withperazone appears on their list, and only in combinadrawn as of August 1, 2013, 2 were approved in the
tion form with sulbactam.18
1980s, 5 in the 1990s, and 5 in the 2000s.
Priority review status is one ex ante indicator of
expected clinical value.19 We found that as a class,
Discussion
antiinfectives had more priority review drug approvThis review of antiinfective approvals and withdrawals than average, with an increasing rate during the
als suggests that reports warning of a decrease in antipast three decades. Over time, priority reviews in
biotic approvals over time and current-day nadir in
the antiinfective class have shifted from antibiotics
antibiotic approvals may be overstated. Simple enuto antivirals (including antiretrovirals). Few priority
meration of annual drug approvals says little about
review antibiotics were subsequently withdrawn, and
clinical impact. Withdrawal from the market is one ex
none for safety-related reasons. It therefore makes
post indicator of modest clinical impact. After adjustsense to focus antibiotic development incentive proing for products withdrawn from the market, net antigrams on particularly novel products that might qualbiotic introductions over the past three decades have
ify for priority review. Notably, the GAIN language in
declined at a slower rate than previously reported,
the recent Food and Drug Administration Safety and
while antivirals and other antiinfectives demonstrate
Innovation Act limits its applicability to “serious and
even more favorable trends by comparison.
life-threatening conditions,”20 which is promising, but
692
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Exhibit 4
New Systemic Antibiotics Approved by the FDA 1980-2009, but Subsequently Withdrawn or Discontinued
Generic Name Antibiotic class

Approval
year
Withdrawal or Discontinuation Dates

Bacampicillin

Penicillin with extended spectrum

1980

Cinoxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1980

Sisomicin

Aminoglycoside

1980

Mezlocillin

Penicillin with extended spectrum

1981

Moxalactam
Azlocillin

Third-generation cephalosporin
Penicillin with extended spectrum

1981*
1982

Cefoperazone

Third-generation cephalosporin

1982

Ceftizoxime

Third-generation cephalosporin

1983

Netilmicin

Aminoglycoside

1983

Amdinocillin

Penicillin with extended spectrum

1984

Cefonicid

Second-generation cephalosporin

1984*

Ceforanide

Second-generation cephalosporin

1984

Cefmenoxime

Third-generation cephalosporin

1987

Cefotiam

Second-generation cephalosporin

1988

Cefmetazole

Second-generation cephalosporin

1989

Cefpiramide

Third-generation cephalosporin

1989

Enoxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1991

Loracarbef
Lomefloxacin

Second-generation cephalosporin
Fluoroquinolone

1991 ∞
1992

Temafloxacin
Dirithromycin

Fluoroquinolone
Macrolide

1992 †
1995

Sparfloxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1996 †

Alatrofloxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1997 †

Trovafloxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1997 † ∞

Grepafloxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1997 †

Gatifloxacin

Fluoroquinolone

1999 † ∞

Withdrawn from Drug Product List Feb 2006; discontinued before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (Dec 2007); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (ANDA, Nov 1995); discontinued before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (ANDA, Feb 2002) (NDA,
Mar 2005); discontinued 4Q 1999
Withdrawn as not marketed (Oct 1996)
Withdrawn by FDA as not marketed (Sept 1997); discontinued before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn from the Drug Product List in June 2008;
discontinued 2Q 2002
Withdrawn as not marketed (Sept 1997); discontinued
2Q 2007
Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2003); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (Oct 1996); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as no longer marketed (Feb 2002); discontinued 4Q 1998
Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2003); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2006); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (June 1997); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2001); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (Aug 2003); discontinued
before 1Q 1993
Withdrawn as not marketed (Mar 2005); discontinued
before Dec. 31, 1997
Withdrawn 2006; discontinued 2Q 2006
Withdrawn from Drug Product List, June 2008; withdrawn
as not marketed (May 2009); discontinued 2Q 2001
Withdrawn June 1992; discontinued 2Q 1992
Withdrawn as no longer marketed (Nov 2007); discontinued 1Q 2004
Withdrawn as not marketed (Mar 2005); discontinued 4Q
2000
Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2006); discontinued 4Q
2000
Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2006); discontinued 4Q
2000
Withdrawn as not marketed (June 2007); discontinued 4Q
1999
Withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness (Sept
2008); discontinued 3Q 2006

* Granted priority review
† Safety-related withdrawal
∞ Commercially-successful (1993-2009 data only)
Source: Authors’ analysis and IMS MIDAS, January 1993-December 2009, IMS Health Incorporated.
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While there is certainly a need for new antibiotic products to combat evolving
resistance among bacteria, policies seeking to remedy a perceived lack of
antibiotic innovation should focus on drug quality, not just quantity. The
historical data presented here provides evidence that simply emphasizing
faster approval of antibiotics based on more limited clinical evidence or
stronger intellectual property rights may encourage the approval of products
that have limited clinical impact or are subsequently withdrawn from
the marketplace for safety or other reasons. Neither represents the
type of antibiotic innovation needed today.
central nervous system effects have been noted with
lomefloxacin.25 Some antibiotics that were not completely withdrawn had specific indications withdrawn
such as telithromycin for acute bacterial sinusitis and
acute exacerbations of chronic bronchitis due to lack
of evidence of efficacy as well as adverse effects. In
addition, the withdrawal data were right censored
because we could not capture potential future withdrawals. For example, we did not treat telithromycin
as withdrawn since it remained on the market at the
time of our analysis although with decreasing usage
it may be completely withdrawn in the future. Finally,
while the data are analyzed only descriptively, that is
consistent with the existing literature on trends in
antibiotic approvals.
In conclusion, we found that simple numerical
declines in antibiotic approvals give an incomplete
picture of drug innovation. Drug approvals are down
in many classes, including cardiovascular drugs, so
the observed trend may have little to do with antibiotics per se. Nor should policymakers emphasize
simple numeric targets without careful focus on the
potential clinical value of newly approved agents and
their demonstrated benefits over currently available
therapies. Numerous antibiotics have suffered from
problems after approval, including withdrawals,
safety-related withdrawals, and a lack of clinical or
commercial significance. While there is certainly a
need for new antibiotic products to combat evolving
resistance among bacteria, policies seeking to remedy a perceived lack of antibiotic innovation should
focus on drug quality, not just quantity. The historical data presented here provides evidence that simply emphasizing faster approval of antibiotics based
on more limited clinical evidence or stronger intellectual property rights may encourage the approval
of products that have limited clinical impact or are
subsequently withdrawn from the marketplace for
safety or other reasons. Neither represents the type
of antibiotic innovation needed today.
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